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cussion, which lasted more than three hours,
they tried to represent the affair as if the
Soviets had still not displayed any willing-
ness to fulfill the obligations stipulated in
the correspondence between Comrade N.S.
Khrushchev and President Kennedy, nota-
bly with regard to IL-28 planes and nuclear
warheads and bombs. At the same time the
Americans kept shying away from a discus-
sion of the issues concerning the Americans’
fulfillment of their own obligations. The
discussion at times became pointed, and this
was an effect created largely by Stevenson
and McCloy.
1. More than half the discussion was
devoted to an exchange of opinions on the
issue of the IL-28 planes located in Cuba.
Stevenson and McCloy stated that the agree-
ment between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev
and Kennedy stipulated the removal of all
these planes from Cuba, and their return to
the Soviet Union. The essence of
Stevenson’s and McCloy’s argument on this
issue can be reduced to the following:
Kennedy’s statement of 22 October and
his proclamation of 23 October placed jet
bombers in the category of the so-called
“offensive” Soviet weaponry in Cuba.
Kennedy’s message of 27 October referred
to the “offensive missile bases,” as well as
to “all armament systems that can be used
for offensive purposes,” apparently includ-
ing jet bombers in this category. Comrade
N.S. Khrushchev indicated in his message
of 28 October that the Soviet government
had issued instructions to dismantle and re-
turn to the Soviet Union the arms that “you
call offensive.” The Americans call both
missiles as well as jet bombers offensive
weaponry.
McCloy and Stevenson came back
many times in the course of the talks to these
arguments, interpreting them in such a way
as to make it seem as though the Soviet
Union had committed itself to dismantle and
return to the Soviet Union from Cuba not
only missiles, but also bombers.
We explained our position in detail to
McCloy and Stevenson, in accordance with
your instructions. We emphasized in particu-
lar that at the present time there is only one
basis for an agreement, the one established
by the exchange of messages between Com-
rades N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. As far
as Soviet obligations are concerned, that
agreement stipulates that the Soviet Union
will remove from Cuba the missile weap-
onry that the President of the USA has called
“offensive,” and that it will never in the fu-
ture supply such weaponry to Cuba. The
USA in its turn committed itself not to in-
vade Cuba, and not to allow any invasion
by the other states of the Western hemi-
sphere. The Soviets are fulfilling to the let-
ter this agreement, which is the result of
compromise and mutual concessions. On 28
October the dismantling of the missiles was
begun, this dismantling was completed on
2 November, and the dismantled missiles
have been broughts to the ports for shipping,
and will be removed no later than 10 No-
vember.
We directed the attention of the Ameri-
cans to the fact that, if they want to raise
new issues, then we have many issues that
we will want to raise too, for example con-
cerning the American military bases on for-
eign territories, but that we are not doing
this because we do not want to complicate
the negotiations.
We adduced concrete facts concerning
the IL-28 bombers, showing that this
bomber is a purely defensive weapon, long
ago outmoded, and that it can be used only
for coastal defense when escorted by anti-
aircraft units. We said with regard to this
that if the USA representatives insist on their
own demands concerning the IL-28 planes,
then in doing so they will only place the
USA in a position in which the whole world
will see that the United States are reneging
on their promise, and imposing unaccept-
able conditions that create the possibility of
a continuation of the conflict.
We said that Stevenson’s assertion in
his letter of 3 November, that according to
the reports of American intelligence there
was evidence that IL-28 bombers are still
being assembled in Cuba, is a fabrication
by American intelligence that clearly aims
to avoid the settlement of the conflict and
the normalization of our relations, and that
indeed tightens the tensions. If the United
States take as their goal a return to the in-
cendiary situation of earlier, then this is
scarcely in the interests of the USA or the
USSR, or in the interests of peace. We pro-
pose to select reasonable positions, and to
proceed in our negotiations from the agree-
ment that has already been reached.
The Americans contested our views of
the purely defensive character of the IL-28
bombers. McCloy and Stevenson asserted
that “in Castro’s hands” these bombers could
be offensive weapons, and that for the Latin
American region they represent a threaten-
ing weapon which the other Latin Ameri-
can countries do not possess.
In response to our statement, in accor-
dance with your instructions, that one can-
not always rely on the facts produced by
intelligence reconnaissance and that, with
regard to the IL-28 bombers, the American
intelligence information on the continuing
assembly in Cuba of these planes is incor-
rect, McCloy asserted that in the photos
taken by an American reconnaissance plane
over the area where IL-28 planes were be-
ing stored, it was obvious that there were
more of them in recent days, and that new
containers of parts for these planes were
being unpacked. In a half-joking tone
McCloy stated that once Soviet representa-
tives had also denied even the American
intelligence photos of missile bases in Cuba.
McCloy said that he himself had seen the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]