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ness of opinion is truth; and at the same time everything that is an object
of opinion is already determined. But again excellence in deliberation
involves reasoning. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is correct-
ness of thinking; for this is not yet assertion, since, while even opinion is
100/Aristotle
not inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, the man who is delib-
erating, whether he does so well or ill, is searching for something and
calculating.
But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of delibera-
tion; hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and what it is
about. And, there being more than one kind of correctness, plainly ex-
cellence in deliberation is not any and every kind; for (1) the incontinent
man and the bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his calcu-
lation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated cor-
rectly, but he will have got for himself a great evil. Now to have deliber-
ated well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness
of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to
attain what is good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a false
syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means,
the middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in
deliberation this state in virtue of which one attains what one ought but
not by the right means. Again (3) it is possible to attain it by long delib-
eration while another man attains it quickly. Therefore in the former
case we have not yet got excellence in deliberation, which is rightness
with regard to the expedient rightness in respect both of the end, the
manner, and the time. (4) Further it is possible to have deliberated well
either in the unqualified sense or with reference to a particular end.
Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which
succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and
excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds
relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is characteristic of men of prac-
tical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be
correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of which practical
wisdom is the true apprehension.
10
Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which
men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are
neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that
rate all men would have been men of understanding), nor are they one of
the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things con-
nected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For
understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchange-
able, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, but
Nicomachean Ethics/101
about things which may become subjects of questioning and delibera-
tion. Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but under-
standing and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom
issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be
done; but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with
goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good
understanding.) Now understanding is neither the having nor the ac-
quiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding
when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so understand-
ing is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the pur-
pose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which
practical wisdom is concerned and of judging soundly; for well and
soundly are the same thing. And from this has come the use of the
name understanding in virtue of which men are said to be of good
understanding, viz., from the application of the word to the grasping of
scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding.
11
What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to be sympa-
thetic judges and to have judgement, is the right discrimination of the
equitable. This is shown by the fact that we say the equitable man is
above all others a man of sympathetic judgement, and identify equity
with sympathetic judgement about certain facts. And sympathetic judge-
ment is judgement which discriminates what is equitable and does so
correctly; and correct judgement is that which judges what is true.
Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be ex-
pected, to the same point; for when we speak of judgement and under-
standing and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit the same
people with possessing judgement and having reached years of reason
and with having practical wisdom and understanding. For all these fac-
ulties deal with ultimates, i.e., with particulars; and being a man of
understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being
able judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned;
for the equities are common to all good men in relation to other men.
Now all things which have to be done are included among particulars or
ultimates; for not only must the man of practical wisdom know particu-
lar facts, but understanding and judgement are also concerned with things
to be done, and these are ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned
with the ultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and the last
102/Aristotle
are objects of intuitive reason and not of argument, and the intuitive
reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchange-
able and first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical rea-
sonings grasps the last and variable fact, i.e., the minor premiss. For
these variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the
end, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these there-
fore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason.
This is why these states are thought to be natural endowments
why, while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, people are
thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive rea-
son. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers correspond to
our time of life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason
and judgement; this implies that nature is the cause. (Hence intuitive
reason is both beginning and end; for demonstrations are from these and
about these.) Therefore we ought to attend to the undemonstrated say-
ings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of prac-
tical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience
has given them an eye they see aright.
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